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# 1NC Putin Shell

A. UQ: Russian oil extraction high now, ensures regime stability. Adomanis[[1]](#footnote-1) ‘14

Russia’s economy had a pretty bad 2013 and there’s simply no point in arguing otherwise. The economy decelerated sharply and is likely to end up with somewhere between 1.3 and 1.4% overall growth. That’s not the apocalypse (heck, it’s not even a recession) but it’s clearly sub-par. Such low growth will quickly  become an enormous problem for the authorities if it continues for much longer.But among all the (justified!) doom and gloom there was a bit of a silver lining:[**Russia’s oil production** just **hit another** post-Soviet **peak**](http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303370904579295942383010208). This obviously doesn’t fix Russia’s large and growing number of economic difficulties, nor does it “justify” the policies of the Russian government. But considering the importance of oil to Russia’s political, economic, and social stability, it’s worth taking a look at a few charts to put the country’s current situation in context. The first is a chart of both Russian oil production and the average price of Brent Crude. This chart is nice because it gives a pretty good indication of the magnitude both of the run-up in oil prices since the late 1990′s and also of the increase in Russian production. Yes it’s true that the pace of production increases in Russia has tailed off, something which people usually associate this with the jailing of Mikhail Khodorkovsky and the re-assertion of state control in the energy sector. Nonetheless, **Russia has** still **managed to achieve annual increases in oil production for 13** out of the past 14 **years**, a real-world performance that was much better than most estimates. The next chart worth considering shows the total amount of money that Russian earns through selling oil, an estimate I developed using historical[production](http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=RS#pet)and[price](http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=pet&s=rbrte&f=w)data from the incredibly useful website of the Energy Information Administration. When you combine the huge increase in crude oil prices that has taken place since the late 1990′s with the substantial increase in Russian oil production, you get a truly spectacular rise in earnings. When Putin first came to power Russia earned about $41 billion from oil sales. Last year it earned about $415 billion. That’s a lot of petro rubles. Russia’s economy is obviously about a lot more than pumping black stuff out of the ground: at market prices only about 20% of Russia’s GDP comes from oil production. So even if the oil sector performs well, the performance of the other 80% of the economy matters a lot more. Russia’s overall economy can continue to perform quite poorly even if oil production continues to grow and oil prices stay high.But **oil** is important because, to use a bit of a crude turn of phrase, it essentially **functions as a Kremlin slush fund.** The Russian oil sector faces some of the highest taxes in the world, and the Russian government captures a staggeringly high percentage of the cost of each barrel. This money then courses through the veins of the Russian economy: some of it is used to pay pensions, some of it is used to subsidize other inefficient industries, and some of it, of course, simply disappears down the black hole of corruption.My point is not that **the Kremlin** is a particularly efficient or astute allocator of oil wealth, merely that it **now has such enormous resources** at its disposal that **it will** likely **find a way to keep itself in power.** A government with access to hundreds of billions of dollars of oil money seems like a government that will be around for awhile, particularly given how robust oil prices have been in the face of sustained economic weakness in the developed world.

B. Links:

1. Oil extraction harms the environment- aff must defend the conflict in the res. Hirji[[2]](#footnote-2) ‘13

An environmental organization with a $350 million war chest, a giant protest vessel, 28 activists and a rubber raft have succeeded in drawing Russian President Vladimir V. Putin [3] into a very public global dispute.  
Attention is now focused on the[**Greenpeace**](http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/) [4] activists—who were arrested last month by Coast Guard agents for trying to hang a protest banner on an Arctic Ocean oil platform—and whether they will languish in prison for up to 15 years each on dubious piracy charges. "They are obviously not pirates," Putin said in a[speech](http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/6032)[5] to the International Arctic Forum last month. Yet Russian authorities so far seem to be throwing the book at the activists as international outrage grows to secure their freedom. Protests have been held at Russian consulates in about a half dozen cities worldwide to release the activists.  
While the unfolding drama is now focused on issues of civil disobedience and human rights, underneath the uproar is a tangle of issues around Arctic drilling that Greenpeace has been campaigning to address for many years. And now it has secured the world's attention and a chance to spark a discussion—and the stakes are high. Earlier this year in a report called[Point of No Return](http://www.greenpeace.org/australia/PageFiles/480942/Point_Of_No_Return.pdf)[6], the confrontational organization **identified oil drilling** in Arctic waters **as one** of the biggest **climate threat**s being ignored by the world's governments.  
"Oil companies plan to take advantage of melting sea ice ... to produce up to 8 million barrels a day of oil and gas," Greenpeace said in the report. "The drilling would add 520 million tons of CO2 a year to global emissions by 2020." That Greenpeace would target Russia's Prirazlomnoye oil[platform](http://www.gazprom.com/about/production/projects/deposits/pnm/)[7]—which this fall is expected be the world's first offshore Arctic well—should not come as a surprise. And it is equally unsurprising that Russia, currently the world's biggest oil producer, would react so sharply to protect its oil interests and the flagship project of its multibillion-dollar quest to drill, especially as the United States is overtaking Russia as the No. 1 energy producer. "This is probably the strongest reaction we've gotten from a government since the French government blew up one of our ships [in 1985 in an anti-nuclear protest]," said Philip Radford, executive director of Greenpeace USA. **Hidden** from view **so far**, however, **has been the environmental damage** the Arctic is already suffering **at the hands of the Russian oil industry**, a degradation that would likely get worse if the oil boom there continues without better regulation, according to Greenpeace and other Russian environmentalists and scientists.  Every year,[according to Greenpeace](http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/campaigns/climate-change/arctic-impacts/The-dangers-of-Arctic-oil/Black-ice--Russian-oil-spill-disaster/)[8], about 30 million barrels of oil products leak from wells and pipelines in Russia. An estimated four million barrels of that, roughly the size of BP's Gulf of Mexico spill, flows straight into the Arctic Ocean through tributaries. The precise impact of these spills on the fragile Arctic environment and its people is unknown but is likely substantial, Greenpeace says. For them the leaks—and the alleged lack of adequate means to deal with them—are an example of an inadequate safety culture in the country's oil industry. And they're causing deep concern about Russia's aggressive push to start drilling for oil in open Arctic waters. "Russia will not be ready for effective monitoring, supervising and working in the Arctic Ocean," said Vladimir Chuprov [9], a Russian citizen and the head of energy for Greenpeace Russia in Moscow, the country's main energy industry watchdog. Chuprov has been monitoring oil spills for the past decade. **Poor Record** While **Russia** produces 12 percent of the world's oil, it **is responsible for** roughly[**half the world's oil spills**](http://en.ria.ru/russia/20121211/178065224.html)[10], according to Greenpeace Russia figures. Broken down, the numbers reveal that some 30 million barrels of petroleum leak from 20,000 inland spills each year.2. CX concession

C. Internal Links: Reduced oil production causes crippling political and economic instability. Pritchard[[3]](#footnote-3) ‘14

There is nothing behind the facade of Vladimir Putin's regime in Russia, says William Browder from Hermitage Capital Management. "All it will take is **a fall in the price of oil** to $60 a barrel **and Putin will be gone within a year.** You'd be surprised how brittle the system really is," he told me at the World Economic Forum in Davos. The "fiscal break-even price" of oil needed to balance the Russian budget is now $117 a barre**l. A** protracted **slump in crude would force the government to** dig deep **into** its **reserve funds, and** **that** in turn **would set off** further **capital flight**. The hedge fund manager – who describes himself as Putin's "enemy number one" – says Russia's $499bn foreign reserves would not prove much a defence in the end. "We saw this in 2008 when everything fell apart in a few months even though Russia had the world's third biggest reserves. It wasn't supposed to happen but it did." A drop in Brent crude to $60 is not impossible. Both Deutsche Bank and Bank of America have warned of a potential glut in oil this year as sanctions against Iran are phased out and Libya's exports revive. The US is expected to add more than 1m barrels per day (b/d) this year. The Saudis may choose not to stabilise the market by cutting output, deliberately letting crude slide below the marginal cost of production of shale.Mr Browder says **Russia is already primed for Ukraine-style** street **protests**. **The catalyst could be oil,** or the secondary effects of Fed tapering as it exposes structural rot across the Brics universe."**There is no ideological fervour the sustain the regime**, though Putin is trying to create a new form of ideological conservatism with his attacks on gays. **Putin's allies will abandon him** as soon as there is trouble," he said. Mr Browder has been sentenced to nine years in prison by the Putin justice machinery, punishment for his campaign in the US for the Magnitsky sanctions against top Russian officials. He faces an international extradition warrant and must be careful where he travels. Interpol refuses to enforce it, deeming it politicised. Britain, Germany, and the Netherlands tell him they will not respect the warrant, but he has take his chances if he goes anywhere else in Europe, let alone to any state across the world without a fully-functioning rule of law. It should be obvious to any extradition court that he is a target of state persecution, but he can't be sure. "They tortured and murdered my lawyer to get at me, like sticking pins into a voodoo doll." Ever the bear, Mr Browder has a cautionary warning for those preparing to jump back in the Brics and mini-Brics. "Emerging market stocks are a lot cheaper now, but they are not yet cheap enough." "Lot of ill-informed money went into these countries during the credit boom. The next big thing coming is that some of these countries will start to close their capital accounts. We're already seeing it in Egypt and Brazil in different ways." Once it spreads, there could be a chain-reaction. "People will start asking themselves which country is next. Once this start people may find they can't get their money out again."

D. Impact: Civil war and European instability, causes stolen nukes and environmental disaster- extinction. David[[4]](#footnote-4) ’97

If internal war does strike Russia, economic deterioration will be a prime cause. From 1989 to the present, the GDP has fallen by 50 percent. In a society where, ten years ago, unemployment scarcely existed, it reached 9.5 percent in 1997 with many economists declaring the true figure to be much higher. Twenty-two percent of Russians live below the official poverty line (earning less than $ 70 a month). Modern Russia can neither collect taxes (it gathers only half the revenue it is due) nor significantly cut spending. Reformers tout privatization as the country's cure-all, but in a land without well-defined property rights or contract law and where subsidies remain a way of life, the prospects for transition to an American-style capitalist economy look remote at best. As the massive devaluation of the ruble and the current political crisis show, Russia's condition is even worse than most analysts feared. If conditions get worse, even the stoic Russian people will soon run out of patience. A future conflict would quickly draw in Russia's military. In the Soviet days civilian rule kept the powerful armed forces in check. But with the Communist Party out of office, what little civilian control remains relies on an exceedingly fragile foundation -- personal friendships between government leaders and military commanders. Meanwhile, the morale of Russian soldiers has fallen to a dangerous low. Drastic cuts in spending mean inadequate pay, housing, and medical care. A new emphasis on domestic missions has created an ideological split between the old and new guard in the military leadership, increasing the risk that disgruntled generals may enter the political fray and feeding the resentment of soldiers who dislike being used as a national police force. Newly enhanced ties between military units and local authorities pose another danger. Soldiers grow ever more dependent on local governments for housing, food, and wages. Draftees serve closer to home, and new laws have increased local control over the armed forces. Were a conflict to emerge between a regional power and Moscow, it is not at all clear which side the military would support. Divining the military's allegiance is crucial, however, since the structure of the Russian Federation makes it virtually certain that regional conflicts will continue to erupt. Russia's 89 republics, krais, and oblasts grow ever more independent in a system that does little to keep them together. As the central government finds itself unable to force its will beyond Moscow (if even that far), power devolves to the periphery. With the economy collapsing, republics feel less and less incentive to pay taxes to Moscow when they receive so little in return. Three-quarters of them already have their own constitutions, nearly all of which make some claim to sovereignty. Strong ethnic bonds promoted by shortsighted Soviet policies may motivate non-Russians to secede from the Federation. Chechnya's successful revolt against Russian control inspired similar movements for autonomy and independence throughout the country. If these rebellions spread and Moscow responds with force, civil war is likely. **Should Russia succumb to internal** war, the consequences for the United States and Europe will be severe. A major power like Russia -- even though in **decline** -- does not suffer civil war quietly or alone. **An embattled Russian Federation might provoke** opportunistic **attacks** **from** enemies such as **China**. Massive flows of **refugees would pour into** central and western **Europe**. **Armed struggles** in Russia **could** easily **spill [over]** into its neighbors. **Damage** **from** the fighting, particularly **attacks on nuclear plants, would poison the environment** of much of Europe and Asia. Within Russia, the consequences would be even worse. Just as the sheer brutality of the last Russian civil war laid the basis for the privations of Soviet communism, a second civil war might produce another horrific regime. Most alarming is the real possibility that the violent **disintegration of Russia could lead to loss of control over its nuclear arsenal**. Nonuclear state has ever fallen victim to civil war, but even without a clear precedent the grim consequences can be foreseen. **Russia** **retains** some **20,000 nuclear weapons** and the raw material for tens of thousands more, in scores of sites scattered throughout the country. So far, the government has managed to prevent the loss of any weapons or much material. If war erupts, however, **Moscow's already weak grip on nuclear sites will slacken**, **making weapons** and supplies **available to** a wide range of **anti-American groups and states**. Such dispersal of nuclear weapons represents the greatest physical threat America now faces. And it is hard to think of anything that would increase this threat more than the chaos that would follow a Russian civil war.

# DA Helpers

## Nationalism/Genocide

Russian economic decline spurs nationalism. Graham[[5]](#footnote-5) ‘09

No one would gainsay the Russian temptation to counter the United States at times, especially along Russia’s periphery; or the obstacles to Russia’s long-term accumulation of power; or the vexations in engaging Russia, particularly now. A decade of socioeconomic collapse and national humiliation (at the hands of the West, Russians believe), followed by the remarkable recovery of the past eight years and efforts to reclaim Russia’s great power status (against the West’s wishes, they are certain), now threatened by the mounting global economic crisis (made in the United States, they say) has produced a heady nationalism, a petulant brew of pride and resentment, of self-confidence and self-doubt, often expressed in caustic anti-American rhetoric and actions.

Russian economic decline spurs anti-democracy

Russian nationalism leads to nuclear war and extinction. Israelyan[[6]](#footnote-6) ‘98

The first and by far most dangerous possibility is what I call the power scenario. Supporters of this option would, in the name of a "united and undivided Russia," radically change domestic and foreign policies. Many would seek to revive a dictatorship and take urgent military steps to mobilize the people against the outside "enemy." Such steps would include Russia's denunciation of the commitment to no-first-use of nuclear weapons; suspension of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) I and refusal to ratify both START II and the Chemical Weapons Convention; denunciation of the Biological Weapons Convention; and reinstatement of a full-scale armed force, including the acquisition of additional intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple warheads, as well as medium- and short-range missiles such as the SS-20. Some of these measures will demand substantial financing, whereas others, such as the denunciation and refusal to ratify arms control treaties, would, according to proponents, save money by alleviating the obligations of those agreements. In this scenario, Russia's military planners would shift Western countries from the category of strategic partners to the category of countries representing a threat to national security. This will revive the strategy of nuclear deterrence -- and indeed, realizing its unfavorable odds against the expanded NATO, Russia will place new emphasis on the first-use of nuclear weapons, a trend that is underway already. The power scenario envisages a hard-line policy toward the CIS countries, and in such circumstances the problem of the Russian diaspora in those countries would be greatly magnified. Moscow would use all the means at its disposal, including economic sanctions and political ultimatums, to ensure the rights of ethnic Russians in CIS countries as well as to have an influence on other issues. Of those means, even the use of direct military force in places like the Baltics cannot be ruled out. Some will object that this scenario is implausible because no potential dictator exists in Russia who could carry out this strategy. I am not so sure. Some Duma members -- such as Victor Antipov, Sergei Baburin, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, and Albert Makashov, who are leading politicians in ultranationalistic parties and fractions in the parliament -- are ready to follow this path to save a "united Russia." Baburin's "Anti-NATO" deputy group boasts a membership of more than 240 Duma members. One cannot help but remember that when Weimar Germany was isolated, exhausted, and humiliated as a result of World War I and the Versailles Treaty, Adolf Hitler took it upon himself to "save" his country. It took the former corporal only a few years to plunge the world into a second world war that cost humanity more than 50 million lives. I do not believe that Russia has the economic strength to implement such a scenario successfully, but then again, Germany's economic situation in the 1920s was hardly that strong either. Thus, I am afraid that economics will not deter the power scenario's would-be authors from attempting it. Baburin, for example, warned that any political leader who would "dare to encroach upon Russia" would be decisively repulsed by the Russian Federation "by all measures on heaven and earth up to the use of nuclear weapons." n10 In autumn 1996 Oleg Grynevsky, Russian ambassador to Sweden and former Soviet arms control negotiator, while saying that NATO expansion increases the risk of nuclear war, reminded his Western listeners that Russia has enough missiles to destroy both the United States and Europe. n11 Former Russian minister of defense Igor Rodionov warned several times that Russia's vast nuclear arsenal could become uncontrollable. In this context, one should keep in mind that, despite dramatically reduced nuclear arsenals -- and tensions -- Russia and the United States remain poised to launch their missiles in minutes. I cannot but agree with Anatol Lieven, who wrote, "It may be, therefore, that with all the new Russian order's many problems and weaknesses, it will for a long time be able to stumble on, until we all fall down together." n12

Russian nationalism leads to aggressive anti-semitism and genocide. Copila[[7]](#footnote-7) ’08

**The anti-Semite dimension of****the Russian nationalism** Anti-Semitism is **almost** inherent to any form of aggressive nationalism. **The allogene,** depicted best **in this type of discourse** by the image of the stateless Jew, corrupts and undermines the nations **in which he carries out his activities,** thus national mobilization must be firstly directed towards the subversions and strangers from within and only then towards external dangers. During the Soviet era, after the year 1960, anti-Semitism had become a requisite of the all finer refined Russian nationalism, reaching all the way to the roots of the October Revolution. Therefore, the true Bolshevik heroes were only Lenin and Stalin, Trotsky and his partisans being only a subversive clique oriented towards the divergence of the Revolution so it would benefit the global Jewish establishment. The Zionist movement 48 was blamed for repeated tentative of destabilizing and compromise on worldwide communism, Fascism and Zionism being considered equal. **Dozens of books, hundred of articles have confirmed (…) that Judaism had no other goals than to install a worldwide Fascism**. Jews were portrayed as the everlasting aggressors, chauvinists, assassins, parasites. Their aim? To dominate the world through astuteness, corruption and murder. Pioneers of capitalism, they were accused of being the source of all historical plagues, being on top of the fight against communism, especially against Russia, which they were trying to destroy. History had been rewritten. (…) Hitler and his Nazis were depicted as puppets in the hands of the Jews. In 1941, they pushed the Fuhrer into attacking the USSR. Their complicity with National Socialism went up until encouraging the extermination of the poorest of the lot in the death camps Emanuel COPILA Ş 72 From the manifestos of the Pamjati national movement, active only in the late 80s, we find out that in the first government of the Soviet Union, made up of 22 members, only two were Russians, the rest being “nationalistic Jews”. These would have contributed actively to the demolishment of churches and of worship houses and of the deportations of intellectuals in camps. Even in Gorbachev’s time, the Jews were accused of occupying the best places in the Russian economy and that they had access to higher education in a much larger proportion than the rest of the population. 50 Among the diseases of the Russian nationalistic sentiment after 1970, anti-Semitism is a constant presence. Everything that goes on in Russia, and also all around the world, and is not agreed by the extreme nationalists, must necessarily be corollary of Jewish or freemason intrigues. 51 Not even today, at the beginning of the 21st century, does the anti-Semitism in Russia show any signs of fading. **Moreover,** the concept has been reinforced**, and the consequences it has triggered at a social level are unsettling:** the numbers of neo-Nazi groups and their victims are increasing day by day. **Only** in 2004 **the** neo-Nazi organizations, among **which The Movement for** Russia’**s National Unity stands out, have** killed 44 people**, a considerable figure** which says a lot about the radicalization of the Russian nationalism**. 52** A frequently met tendency of the Russian neo-Nazis is to organize “squads” made up of volunteers that will act out at the outskirts of large cities so as to fight against the crimes caused by Asian or Muslim immigrants

## Terrorism

DA turns terrorism, two warrants:

A. Oil revenue is key to a budget that funds social welfare programs- solves the root cause of extremism. De Haas[[8]](#footnote-8) ‘05

In 2002 President Putin took a large number of measures **in order to adapt legislation and to reform the troops of the MoD and of the other ministries with armed formations** to handle the threat of terrorism. Beslan has shown that new laws and military reforms are insufficient. Legal and military measures are not enough. At the bottom of the threat of terrorism are social and economic roots: unemployment, poverty, lack of education, housing and medical care. Putin has announced that he will also take measures in the social-economic field. However, Russian governments have made similar statements after the first (1994-1996) and second Chechen wars. It will be for the benefit of the population of Russia as a whole when this time these promises will be fulfilled.

B. Creates a market for nuclear weapons when the Ministry of defense is underpaid- empirically. Filger[[9]](#footnote-9) ‘09

In Russia **historically,** economic health and political stability are intertwined to a degree that is rarely encountered in other major **industrialized** economies**. It was the economic stagnation of the former Soviet Union that led to its political downfall. Similarly,** Medvedev and Putin, both intimately acquainted with their nation’s history, are unquestionably alarmed at the prospect that Russia’s economic crisis will endanger the nation’s political stability, achieved at great cost after years of chaos following the demise of the Soviet Union. Already, strikes and protests are occurring among rank and file workers facing unemployment or non-payment of their salaries. Recent polling demonstrates that the once supreme popularity ratings of Putin and Medvedev are eroding rapidly. Beyond the political elites are the financial oligarchs, who have been forced to deleverage, even unloading their yachts and executive jets in a desperate attempt to raise cash. Should the Russian economy deteriorate to the point where economic collapse is not out of the question, the impact will go far beyond the obvious accelerant such an outcome would be for the Global Economic Crisis. There is a geopolitical dimension that is even more relevant then the economic context. Despite its economic vulnerabilities and perceived decline from superpower status, Russia remains one of only two nations on earth with a nuclear arsenal of sufficient scope and capability to destroy the world as we know it. For that reason, it is not only President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin who will be lying awake at nights over the prospect that a national economic crisis can transform itself into a virulent and destabilizing social and political upheaval. It just may be possible that U.S. President Barack Obama’s national security team has already briefed him about the consequences of a major economic meltdown in Russia for the peace of the world. After all, the most recent national intelligence estimates put out by the U.S. intelligence community have already concluded that the Global Economic Crisis represents the greatest national security threat to the United States, due to its facilitating political instability in the world. During the years Boris Yeltsin ruled Russia, security forces responsible for guarding the nation’s nuclear arsenal went without pay **for months** at a time, leading to fears that desperate personnel would illicitly sell nuclear weapons to terrorist organizations. If the current economic crisis in Russia were to deteriorate much further, how secure would the Russian nuclear arsenal remain? **It may be that the financial impact of the Global Economic Crisis is its least dangerous consequence.**

# 2NR O/V Impact Calc

If we win the disad, vote neg:

A. Controls the internal link- instability cuts funding and communication to nuclear facilities which enables terrorist attacks and plant failures causing massive radiation leaks- that’s David ’99- and a net bad for the environment- stronger and more probable link because it taints the entire ecosystem and radioactive waste lasts millions of years

B. Scope- the mere perception of weakness invites Chinese attack and explodes into full on Sino-Russian war- another link to nuclear escalation- triggers waves of refugees flooding into Eastern Europe and capital reserve flights from oil shocks go global increasing the probability of war by desparate nations- that’s Pritchard ’14, whereas…

C. Probability- political stability directly correlates with sustained oil revenues as Kremlin slush fund for the past thirteen years so uniqueness is empirical confirmation for the link- that’s Adomanis ’14- and these impacts are already happening in Ukraine- cutting oil extraction means Putin can no longer pacify oligarchs and corrupt regional leaders that almost caused fragmentation in the 90s- that’s also Pritchard ’14, whereas…

# 2NR FLs

### A2 No Elite Support

1. T/Oil revenue is crucial to stability- flows throughout the economy. Gustafson[[10]](#footnote-10) ‘12

Last winter, a wave of mass demonstrations suddenly broke the surface calm of Russian politics. A new middle class, born of the oil-based prosperity of the last decade, took to the streets to voice its opposition to the perceived corruption of the political elite, especially United Russia, the ruling party of then Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. For a time, as the protest movement gained momentum, the very foundations of the regime appeared to shake. But in the March 2012 presidential election, Putin managed to win comfortably in the first round, and despite widespread charges of manipulation, even the opposition conceded that he had earned a convincing victory.  The unprecedented protests and Putin's return to the presidency renewed speculation about whether Russia will keep moving toward political and economic modernity or lapse back into Soviet-style stagnation instead. The answer to that question can be found in the country's most important economic sector: oil. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, **the Russian government has become** increasingly **dependent** **on** revenue from **oil** exports. **It** **taxes** the lion's share of the **profits** of producers **and transfers them to the rest of the economy through** state-mandated **investment programs** and state-funded **welfare**, **pensions, and subsidies**. The spectacular growth of state income generated by **oil has** helped keep **[kept]** **Putin in power**, **enabling him to secure** the **support of key interest groups** **and** **maintain**, at least until recently, a **high l**evel of **popularity**.  For now, high oil prices are keeping this system running. But sustaining it requires a steadily expanding stream of revenue from commodities, especially oil. In the coming years, however, oil profits are more likely to shrink than grow. For the past two decades, Russia has coasted on an oil legacy inherited from Soviet days. The assets of that era are now deteriorating. Russia is not running out of oil, but it is running out of cheap oil. Much of the oil still in the ground will be more difficult and costly to find and produce. As expenses go up, profit margins will decline. At the same time, the oil industry will have to spend more of its remaining profits on its own renewal.  Neither Russia's oil industry nor the Russian state, however, is adequately prepared to deal with the coming challenge. Both have spent the last two decades competing for control of the country's oil assets instead of cooperating to modernize the industry and prepare for the next stage of development. The state's fiscal and regulatory system, although it has been successful in extracting revenue, constrains investment and stifles innovation. The result is an industry that lags behind its foreign peers, and this at the very moment that the global oil industry is experiencing an unprecedented technological revolution. At the same time, Russia is showing some of the classic signs of what economists call "Dutch disease," the economic stagnation, especially in manufacturing, caused by an overreliance on commodity exports at the expense of other parts of the economy. In the words of Alexei Kudrin, Russia's finance minister from 2000 to 2011, "The oil industry, from being a locomotive for the economy, has become a brake." Although Russia's leaders view the country's dependence on oil with growing anxiety, there is no realistic escape: **oil will dominate the future of Russia for years** to come. But Moscow can still choose how to deal with that dominance. On the one hand, the state could further expand its role in the oil industry, squeezing out private shareholders, forcing down dividends, and dictating where the oil companies invest their resources. But that is unlikely to provide much incentive for efficiency or innovation. On the other hand, it could follow a more productive path. The government could rein in its spending, thereby reducing the need for oil revenues, and loosen its grip on the oil industry, so as to encourage the type of innovation that will renew it. And so oil, paradoxically, is both a force for prolonged political and economic stasis and Russia's best hope for escaping it. For political leaders in Moscow, **the oil industry** inherited from Soviet times still **generates enough income to support a comfortable political and economic system** in which it is all too tempting to linger. Only if this industry modernizes will Russia have the revenues to support any sort of transition -- and that will happen only if the state and its policies modernize along with it. Yet for now, thanks to high oil prices, the leadership seems more inclined to choose the status quo than adaptation. f f

O/W:

A. Quantitatively- I control two internal links to Russian stability- both economic and political- so even if he accesses one of them my evidence indicates the magnitude of either overwhelms the turn

B. Reversibility- no substitute industries exist so oil is crucial AND the current political model is unlikely to change- loss of oil revenue causes irreversible harm whereas his impacts can be solved later

C. Probability- oil revenue has empirically pacified protests and strengthened relationships with regional oligarchs- the 2012 elections prove my link is the most likely to maintain stability- and 2013 loss of revenue prove it’s bidirectional

2. Budgetary spending is key to elite control- ensures loyalty that stops total collapse. Krastev and Inozemstev[[11]](#footnote-11) ‘13

So when Putin has clamped down against graft -- most notoriously in the case of the jailed former oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky -- he has limited himself to precision strikes against well-known targets. During the days in which Putin governed Russia in tandem with then President Dmitry Medvedev, corruption was treated mostly as an institutional issue to be cured by the market, not by the courts. Between 2009 and 2012, the number of corrupt Russian officials sentenced in court was nearly halved, from 10,700 to 5,500. **Putin’s** reasoning was all very simple: in his nightmares, he **saw elite-led unrest** in Russia’s far-flung regions and infighting among the Moscow elite **bringing down his regime.** The traumatic **fragmentation of the** 19**90s** haunted him. Demurring on corruption, he believed, was key to exerting control -- or at least buying it from elites. To provide enough patronage to go around, he dramatically increased the size of the bureaucracy. From 2000 to 2012, the number of state officials increased by more than 65 percent -- from 1.3 million to 2.1 million. And the number of security personnel in Russia, excluding the military, reached 2.3 million. **Corrupt state officials have become the most important support** group **for the regime**. So instead of reducing the corrupt bureaucracy or purging it, Putin decided to enlarge it. In the 1990s, business captured the state in Russia; after Putin’s ascendance, the state captured business. No longer was it necessary for a businessperson to bribe a state official in order to procure a government contract: in most cases, it would be the state official’s wife, lover, or partner who would win the deal. Making corruption from above seem normal, and matching it with ever-present petty corruption from below, was also a key element of the message that was at the heart of Putin’s regime: namely, that there were no alternatives. Indeed, surveys reveal that support for the regime derives not from those who believe that corruption is not a problem -- that segment of the population is fairly miniscule -- but from those who agree that nothing can be done about it. It is easy to understand why: currently, approximately $300 billion -- or 16 percent of Russia’s GDP -- has been eaten up by corruption. In general, the costs of state investment projects exceed original es¬timates by anywhere from 250 to 400 percent. THE NAVALNY FACTOR Why, then, did Putin bet the farm on an anti-corruption effort? The answers are surprisingly straightforward: a sluggish economy, political pressure created by a lawyer-blogger named Alexei Navalny, and, finally, a sense of betrayal. First, in the wake of the financial crisis, **Putin’s ability to deliver** on earlier promises has diminished; to secure **social harmony [has diminished]**, **Moscow has** dramatically **increased** its **budgetary spending**, even if most of that money is either wasted or stolen. Economists claim that the cost of organizing the Winter Olympics in 2014 will be as high as the cost of organizing the games of 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, and 2010 combi¬ned. **Putin’s bureaucracy** has become not only too expensive but also, as the Moscow protests demonstrated, incapable of ensuring political stability. So, more than ever before, the regime’s **stability depends** on **its ability to improve** the **real incomes of ordinary Russians**, **and** reducing corruption is the most obvious way -- but as Putin will learn, also the most politically risky way -- to **increase government revenue**. In addition, Putin knows that Alexei Navalny, who became Russia’s most popular opposition leader after the protests of 2011, is an opponent to be taken seriously. It was only Moscow’s middle class that demanded “Russia without Putin,” but Navalny’s anti-corruption message resonated outside the capital. Most Russians endorsed his claim that the governing United Russia party was “a party of crooks and thieves.” Opinion polls indicate that, by 2010, state officials, not the oligarchs, had become the poster children for corruption. And while Navalny titillated citizens with the hope that one day he could become president, Putin wholesale adopted Navalny’s role as white knight of the corruption fight. He has tried to position himself as a man of anti-corruption actions, not simply of anti-corruption talk. (Of course, Navalny himself will probably be put in prison on a charge of -- what else? -- corruption.) The reluctance of the Russian elites to join the Kremlin’s anti-Western hysteria in the wake of the Moscow protests was another factor that encouraged Putin to confront corruption. **The elites’ disinclination to confront the West indicated** to **Putin** that corruption is a veritable instrument of control but that he **does not have** **a monopoly on** wielding **it**. After all, Russian elites may be loyal to Putin, but they have insured themselves in the West. It is hardly surprising that those who keep their money and their families in the West are not eager to badmouth the countries where their treasured assets reside. Putin’s war on corruption -- and its crackdown on foreign bank accounts -- was meant to punish those elites who refused to do his bidding and force them back into the fold. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES Putin will soon learn that pervasive corruption leads to the decay of authoritarian regimes, but -- as the breakdown of Hosni Mubarak’s regime in Egypt demonstrated -- it is anti-corruption campaigns that often cause their collapse. In the absence of an ideology that secures the elites’ loyalty, the leader can either control corruption or use it as an instrument of control; he cannot do both. The signs of trouble are clearly at hand. In February, Vladimir Pekhtin, chair of the State Duma ethics committee (and a well-known Putin loyalist), ironically became the first high-profile victim of the declared war on corruption. After Navalny revealed on his blog that Pekhtin had failed to declare a Miami condominium worth several million dollars, Pekhtin was forced to vacate his parliamentary seat. Putin had not wanted to punish the loyal Pekhtin, but he was forced into it by his own rules. The case is illustrative: Putin cannot decide on the targets of the anti-corruption campaign unilaterally. Apart from the Pekhtin episode, the Kremlin initiated a wave of anti-corruption cases implicating various government agencies and state-owned companies. The Ministry of Defense came first. Following an investigation, Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov was sacked and questioned as a witness in a case involving illegal sales of military-owned real estate, resulting in more than $130 million in damages. Next up was a case of embezzlement by the Ministry for Regional Development for the construction of facilities for the 2012 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Vladivostok. (Former Deputy Minister Roman Panov wound up in prison.) Soon afterward, OAO Russian Space Systems, the company responsible for building the GLONASS satellite positioning system, found itself at the center of a scandal when it was discovered that more than $210 million had been transferred to fly-by-night company accounts. And just recently, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry for Regional Development, and the Ministry of Communications have become the focus of high-profile corruption scandals. In every case, the moral of Putin’s story is unambiguous: stealing in exchange for loyalty remains the custom, but if the elites want to continue enjoying their right to steal, they should repatriate their money and family to Russia. In the case of state officials, keeping money abroad is now considered treason. One major problem, however, is that the elites have nothing to gain from this new contract. Russian history has taught them that in times of purges, nobody can feel secure -- today’s hangmen are tomorrow’s victims. The anti-corruption campaign will not clean up the elites, but it will purge those who are best integrated into global business networks. The anti-corruption crusade has shifted the power of managing the economy from relatively competent liberal economists to managers enjoying the support of the top levels of the law-enforcement agencies. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that what is propagated as a war on corruption has turned into a war for power between two or more clans of corrupt officials. For the moment, the anti-corruption campaign has weakened the position of those closer to Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev -- not because they are more corrupt but because they are judged as less loyal. Putin, meanwhile, is doomed to face the bureaucracy’s forms of everyday resistance, such as constant delays, lost files, confused explanations, and low-risk boycotts. Two factors are working to erode Putin’s power: the elite’s natural tendency to think beyond short-term interests and Putin’s enhanced requirement of loyalty. On the first point, elites are nervous because the legitimacy of the system is rooted in Putin’s personal popularity, and Putin has done nothing to prepare the system for his eventual departure. On the second, Putin has redefined loyalty so that it now means not only supporting the Kremlin’s decisions but also repatriating assets from abroad and fighting Putin’s critics as personal enemies. So, although it may look like **Putin** is consolidating power through the anti-corruption campaign, in reality he faces a critical moment and **is at risk of losing his sway over the elites.** A familiar paradox to students of corruption is that the more the media writes about corruption, the more the people perceive their country and their government as corrupt. But it is not only this familiar dynamic that is at work in Russia. In fact, recent surveys reveal another correlation that should terrify the Kremlin’s spin doctors: the rise in citizen expectations about fighting corruption leads to demands for radical political change. And although the Kremlin hopes that the growing insecurity of the elites will make them more obedient, a viable alternative scenario is that it will push them to seek guarantees outside of Putin’s system. So, contrary to the Kremlin’s expectations, the anti-corruption campaign could both weaken the loyalty of the elites and strengthen the citizens’ demands for change. In an effort to revise the bargain that has kept him in power for over a decade, Putin may well have planted the seeds of his own demise.

O/W

A. I control UQ- Putin is on the verge of loosing elite backing after anti-corruption measures that increases the internal probability that my impacts happen only because of the aff

B. Reverse Causal- continued extraction and new development in the Article circle ensures increases in real income and government revenue- implies status quo solves best- and our link to the aff is more probable and of higher magnitude

C. Probability- my evidence cites fragmentation from the 1990s which is a mirror image of what happens in the aff world- makes the entire scenario more likely

### Risk Weighing

A fraction of the link is sufficient- also proves reverse causality. Soldatkin[[12]](#footnote-12) ‘14

MOSCOW, Jan 2 (Reuters) -[**Russia**](http://www.reuters.com/places/russia)**retained the title of** the **world's top oil producer** with 2013 output reaching a post-Soviet high as **rising exports** to[China](http://www.reuters.com/places/china?lc=int_mb_1001) **and strong prices allow the Kremlin to maintain record spending from an overstretched budget**. **Energy has been the engine of** Russia's **growth** during more than a decade of leadership by President Vladimir Putin, **with oil and gas accounting for** **more** **than** **half of** budget **revenues**.But **the government**, which has amassed some of the world's largest foreign exchange reserves of over $500 billion, **has been increasingly overstretching** its **finances due to social spending** promised by Putin before the 2012 election **as well as** a swelling $50 billion budget for **the** 2014[**Winter Olympics**](http://www.reuters.com/subjects/olympics-2014?lc=int_mb_1001).Keeping oil output high has therefore been a priority for the government. The rise has defied predictions that new fields in East Siberia and the[Arctic](http://www.reuters.com/places/arctic?lc=int_mb_1001)will be unable to compensate for declines from ageing oilfields in West Siberia."Enough investment is being made to slow declines in West Siberia and increase production in East Siberia in order to make for small net production increases," analysts from **the International Energy Agency** (IEA) told Reuters on Thursday.The IEA, the West's energy watchdog, expects Russian production to remain flat at around 10.5 million barrels per day (bpd) until the end of the decade, and then decrease to about 9.5 million bpd by 2035. The IEA **says** that **key to maintaining Russian production levels would be the Kremlin's ability to extract hard-to-recover oil,** emulating U.S. successes, **and** to **encourage more production in remote**[Arctic](http://www.reuters.com/places/arctic?lc=int_mb_1001)and East Siberia **regions**. Despite record output, **Russia's budget** funding **gap** **could reach** some $300 billion between 2017 and 2020 should spending remain high and oil prices drop, according to the Finance Ministry's budget strategy to 2030.That is **three times the** current **value of the Reserve Fund**, a rainy-day collection of windfall energy revenues.Last year's budget was estimated to balance at an oil price of $110 per barrel and this year's at some $115 a barrel, Alfa Bank chief economist Natalia Orlova said. That is dangerously close to or even higher than current prices for benchmark Brent crude, which stood at an average of below $110 in 2013 and are expected to remain under downward pressure in years to come due to a U.S. shale oil boom and a possible rise in exports from[Iran](http://www.reuters.com/places/iran). WORLD'S TOP Russian energy ministry data showed on Thursday that the country's oil output rose to a post-Soviet high of 10.51 million bpd in 2013, up almost 1.4 percent from 2012. December's monthly production averaged 10.63 million bpd, also a post-Soviet high. Russian output likely stayed above that of[Saudi Arabia](http://www.reuters.com/places/saudi-arabia), which kept production steady at around 9.7 million bpd in October and November. Saudi data for December is not yet available. Almost all large Russian oil firms increased output in 2013 as they boosted drilling, including Lukoil, Russia's second-largest oil producer and top non-state oil company, which had logged declines in the previous three years.State-controlled Rosneft, the world's top listed oil producer, posted a dramatic jump in output to 3.1 million bpd thanks to the acquisition of rival TNK-BP and production increases in East Siberia.The year was also marked by a further diversion of Russian oil to[China](http://www.reuters.com/places/china?lc=int_mb_1001), away from saturated[European markets](http://www.reuters.com/finance/markets/europe?lc=int_mb_1001), as eastbound flows rose by almost a fifth to 740,000 bpd. As[Russia](http://www.reuters.com/places/russia?lc=int_mb_1001)agreed to increase deliveries further to China in coming years, the Asian giant will likely replace[Germany](http://www.reuters.com/places/germany)as the largest customer for Russian pipeline oil in the first quarter of 2014. Despite the jump in eastbound flows, Russian oil exports outside the former Soviet Union fell by around 2.5 percent to 4.53 million bpd as[Russia](http://www.reuters.com/places/russia?lc=int_mb_1001)ramped up oil refining. Domestic refining rose by 180,000 bpd, reflecting the country's $55 billion programme launched in 2011 to modernise its refineries and encourage exports of high-quality oil products. Gazprom, the world's top gas producer, saw its output slip to 1.30 billion[cubic](http://www.reuters.com/finance/stocks/overview?symbol=CUB&lc=int_mb_1001)metres (bcm) per day from 1.31 bcm per day in 2012 although its exports to Europe jumped 16 percent to a record 161.5 billion cubic metres.

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